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Abstract This paper studies how dyadic social support is affected by heteroge-
neity of the partners. We distinguish heterogeneity with respect to three param-
eters: the likelihood of needing support; the benefits from receiving support;
and the costs of providing support. Hypotheses are based on a game-theoretic
analysis of an iterated support game. First, we predict that heterogeneity in
one of the parameters hampers social support. Second, we predict that under
heterogeneity with respect to two of the parameters, support is most likely if
there is a specific heterogeneous distribution such that heterogeneity in one
parameter ‘compensates’ for heterogeneity in the other parameter. If there is
no compensation social support is even more hampered. The hypotheses have
been tested by experimental data with a mixed within-subject, between-subject
design. The data gives support to the hypotheses.
Keywords Dyadic social support · Iterated support game · Human subject
experiments
JEL codes C91 · C92 · C72
1 Introduction
This paper seeks to study issues regarding social support between heterogeneous
partners in durable relationships. We distinguish heterogeneity between actors
S. Vogt (B) · J. Weesie
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with respect to individual properties such as benefits from receiving support,
costs for providing support, and the likelihood of needing support (from now
on called neediness). Individuals are likely to vary in these properties (see, e.g.,
Blau 1964, 1968). Take as an example two colleagues, Ego and Alter, who from
time to time give each other advice. Ego, who has less work experience than
Alter, might benefit more from this supportive relation than Alter does. At the
same time, giving advice might be more costly for Ego than for Alter. Since
Ego is less experienced than Alter, Ego needs advice more often than Alter
does. What effects do these differences in the individual properties have on the
supportive relation? Is Alter unwilling to give advice because receiving advice
is of little profit for Alter? Is Alter willing to give support because it is cheap
for him or her to do so? Ego benefits a lot from receiving advice, but also pays
a lot for giving advice. Does that make Ego more or less willing to be sup-
portive? Does it matter that Ego asks for advice more often than Alter does?
It is not clear whether and how heterogeneity in several dimensions between
persons facilitates or hampers social support. We expect that heterogeneity
in one dimension (e.g., Ego has higher costs of providing support than Alter
does) leads to different behavioral consequences than heterogeneity in several
dimensions (e.g., Ego has higher costs of providing support and higher benefits
from receiving support). We therefore want to study the effects of heteroge-
neity in multiple individual properties on social support simultaneously. We
argue that it is the heterogeneity per se that affects the relation. The degree of
heterogeneity of actors is a dyadic characteristic, and this is intricately related
to the dissimilarity of actors (see for instance, Frank 1985). We are interested
on whether mutual support is more likely if Ego and Alter are homogeneous
or if they are heterogeneous. Thus, we are not interested on whether Ego pro-
vides more often support in a heterogeneous relation than Alter does. In the
literature on similarity and social support, heterogeneity in several dimensions
is seldom studied simultaneously.
In earlier work we have extensively studied supportive relations (Vogt and
Weesie 2004). Using a game-theoretic model on social support, called the iter-
ated support game (ISG), actors are characterized by their neediness of sup-
port, the benefits from receiving support, and the costs of providing support.1
We introduce the ISG and the relevant predictions in more detail in the next
section. We subsequently describe an experimental test.
2 The game-theoretic model
2.1 Model of support
Social support occurs in the context of durable relations (Blau 1968 and 1964;
Homans 1961; Emerson 1976). In a durable relation, it can be individually
rational to provide support because other persons may repay these services in
1 We also analyzed effects of heterogeneity in time preferences. Since time preferences were not
taken into account in the experimental test, we do not discuss them in this paper.
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the future. IfAlter is not helpingEgo today,Egomight not helpAlter either next
time. In this sense, the long-term benefits of supporting each other can be higher
than the short-term benefits from not supporting each other. Thus, support in
durable relationships can be based on the possibility that actors threaten each
other with refusing support and can promise each other rewards for being sup-
ported. This mechanism is known as conditional cooperation (Axelrod 1984).
We study exclusively durable pairwise relationships. Wemodel social support in
an ISG. At each time, either actor A (πA) or actor B (πB) needs support. When
Aneeds support, B decides whether or not to supportA.Only one person needs
support at one time point, πA + πB = 1. If A receives support from B, A will
obtain the benefits (bA) at costs (cB) for B. However, next time the situation
can be reversed with B needing support from A. The ISG continues after each
time point with a constant continuation probability w, with 0 < w < 1. Sub-
stantially, the continuation probability refers to the common future of persons
having a supportive relation, e.g., colleagues with indefinite contracts or fami-
lies that rent houses next to each other. Both actors would obviously prefer to
receive support but not to provide support. However, in the long run the short-
term costs can be overcome by the long-term benefits from support received
as a repayment in kind. If the common future is ‘long enough’, actors have an
incentive to offer support (see e.g., Kreps 1990; Rubinstein 1990).
We assume that bi > ci > 0, i.e., the benefits to i of support received are larger
than the costs to i if he or she helps j. We are not comparing the benefits of one
player to the costs of another player, thus, there is no interpersonal comparison
of utilities. Mutually providing support is more beneficial for both actors than







actors cannot leave the relationship, and do not know when the relationship
ends. Both partners know the parameters of the support situation πi, ci, bi, and
w. We distinguish heterogeneity in the ISG in terms of likelihood of needing
support (πA = πB), benefits from receiving support (bA = bB), and costs of
providing support (cA = cB). If two actors differ in at least one of the three
parameters, the iterated support game is said to be heterogeneous, otherwise
the game is homogeneous.
2.2 Analysis
In Vogt and Weesie (2004), we presented a game-theoretic analysis of the ISG.
We derived an equilibrium condition for trigger strategies to see under which
conditions rational partners provide support. Trigger strategies are a particular
implementation of reciprocity. An actor using a trigger strategy never refuses
support the first time around, but if support has been denied, the actor refuses
support from then on. If two actors use trigger strategies, they will both always
provide support. We do not claim that subjects actually use trigger strategies.
However, the analytical treatment of trigger strategies serves an important
theoretical purpose. If exchange of social support is not individually rational
among actors using trigger strategies, then it is not individually rational among
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any other strategies either (see, e.g., Abreu 1988). Thus, we use the restric-
tiveness of the equilibrium condition for trigger strategies as an indicator of
the likelihood of support. Trigger strategies are in equilibrium if the following
threshold condition is fulfilled:
ζ ∗ = max(ζA, ζB) ≤ w,
with ζi = 1
πiηi + (1 − πj)ηi
with ηi = bici > 1 for i = A,B, i = j. (1)
According to the equilibrium condition, support between rational actors
requires that a certain threshold is smaller than the continuation probability
w. This threshold depends on the costs (ci), the benefits (bi), neediness (πi),
and the continuation probability (w). Rational cooperation (mutual support)
requires that no actor face strong incentives to deviate from mutual support.
Thus, both individual thresholds have to be smaller or equal to the continua-
tion probability w, i.e., the dyadic threshold ζ ∗ has to be smaller or equal to
the continuation probability w. While it is only a necessary condition for social
support that the individual thresholds are smaller or equal to the continuation
probability, it is sufficient if the dyadic threshold is smaller or equal to the con-
tinuation probability. The individual threshold ζi increases in the benefit-cost
ratios ηi (i.e., increases in the costs and decreases in the benefits), and in need-
iness πi. Note that the equilibrium condition depends on the benefits bi and
costs ci only through the benefit–cost ratio ηi. From now on we therefore study
heterogeneity in two parameters: the benefit-cost ratio ηi and neediness πi.
2.3 Hypotheses
The equilibrium condition (1) states that there will be no support between
people if the dyadic threshold ζ ∗ is larger than the continuation probability w,
and that there will be full support if the dyadic threshold ζ ∗ is smaller or equal
than the continuation probability w. We do not expect such a sharp distinction
empirically. First of all, it is not straightforward for subjects to compute the
equilibrium threshold. Second, subjects presumably do not play trigger strat-
egies. For instance, occasional refusal of support may well be forgiven. And
third, there is a difference between the prediction of the existence of an equi-
librium at the dyadic level as stated in (1), and the prediction of how a person
behaves in the decision situations at the individual level. We do not expect that
people either provide full support or no support depending merely on whether
a certain threshold is larger or smaller than a given continuation probability.We
use the game-theoretic results heuristically and test less strict hypotheses. We
expect less support between subjects, the larger ζ ∗ and the smaller w. Keeping
the continuation probability w fixed, ζ ∗ can be treated as an indicator for ‘how
likely social support is’ between pairs of subjects.
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Hypothesis 1 (dyadic threshold) The larger the dyadic threshold ζ ∗, the smaller
the probability of providing support.
The dyadic threshold ζ ∗ is a function of ηi and πi. How does the dyadic thres-
hold ζ ∗ depend on these parameters? The comparison of heterogeneous situa-
tions with homogeneous situations is not straightforward. We need a method to
compare homogeneous and heterogeneous ISGs. One common method to do
this is to keep the ‘total amount’ of the parameters for the benefit-cost ratio and
for neediness constant and to study the consequences of varying the distribution
of the parameters between the actors (constant sum condition). This resembles
the distribution of a fixed amount of tangible resources between the actors.
Similar approaches to study effects of ‘inequality’ can be found, for instance,
in the literature on income inequality (see e.g., Atkinson 1983; Sen 1997) and
on insurance and uncertainty (see e.g., Arrow 1951). Given the constant sum
condition, the minimization of ζ ∗ is not equivalent with minimizing ζA and ζB
at the same time. If ζA decreases, ζB necessarily increases. To simplify the pre-
sentation of the analysis we induce heterogeneity in the benefit-cost ratio ηi via
the costs (cB > cA) and keep the benefits (bA = bB) homogeneous. We do not
have a theoretical reason to vary the costs and fix the benefits. Our experimental
design is merely based on the intuition that heterogeneity in the costs is more
salient than heterogeneity in the benefits.
We now consider several heterogeneous and homogeneous distributions of
the parameters. First, we address the situation with homogeneity in all param-
eters. It can be shown (see Vogt and Weesie 2004) that ζ ∗ is smallest under
a homogeneous distribution of all parameters and equal individual thresholds
(ζA = ζB).
Hypothesis 2 (homogeneity) A homogeneous distribution of all parameters
between the actors, πA = πB and ηA = ηB, leads to optimal conditions of social
support.
Next, we consider heterogeneity in only one parameter, and homogeneity in
the others. For example, B has higher support costs than A. Consequently, the
support situation is more difficult for B than for A. It can be shown that the
dyadic threshold is larger under heterogeneity in one parameter than in the sit-
uation with equal costs. Thus, if cB > cA, ζB is larger than ζA, and ζ ∗ = (ζA, ζB)
is larger than under cA = cB. Analogously, heterogeneity in π hampers social
support.
Hypothesis 3 (heterogeneity in one parameter) The probability of providing
social support is smaller under a heterogeneous distribution in one parameter
than under a homogeneous distribution in all parameters. The more heteroge-
neous the distribution of one parameter, the less likely is social support.
Now we allow heterogeneity in the benefit-costs parameter and neediness
(ηi and πi). We then have to differentiate between two feasible situations. The
first situation is characterized by (πA − πB)(cA − cB) < 0. Given heterogeneity
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in one parameter, adding heterogeneity in another parameter makes social sup-
port even less likely than in a situationwithheterogeneity in only oneparameter.
Assume again that providing support is more costly for B than it is for A. This
already makes support more difficult for B. Now assume that at the same time,
A needs support more often than B does. Thus, B is asked to provide support
more often thanA is, although it is more costly for B than for A to give support.
Thus, B has two ‘problems’, namely high support costs and a very needy part-
ner. The heterogeneous distribution of one parameter (cB > cA) ‘compounds’
with the heterogeneous distribution of another parameter (πB < πA). Such a
heterogeneous distribution of two parameters leads to more heterogeneity in
the individual thresholds (ζA > ζB) than a heterogeneous distribution of only
one parameter, and consequently to a larger dyadic threshold ζ ∗.
Hypothesis 4 (compounded heterogeneity) The probability of providing social
support is smaller under a heterogeneous distribution of two parameters, such
that the heterogeneity of one parameter compounds with the heterogeneity of
the other parameter, than under a heterogeneous distribution of one param-
eter. The more the heterogeneity of the two parameters compounds, the less
likely is social support.
In a second class of situations, characterized by (πA − πB)(cA − cB) > 0, we
consider heterogeneity in two parameters in which ‘each actor has a problem’.
For instance, B has higher support costs, but A needs support less often than B
does. In this sense, the problems are ‘divided’ between B and A; B’s problem
are the high support costs, A’s problem is that B is needier in comparison to him
or herself. In other words, the heterogeneous distribution of the costs (cB > cA)
‘compensates’ for the heterogeneous distribution of neediness (πB > πA). If
the heterogeneous distributions of the two parameters compensate each other
optimally, this leads to an equalization of the individual thresholds (ζA = ζB).
Consequently, under optimal compensation (ζ ∗ = ζA = ζB) ζ ∗is less restric-
tive than under heterogeneity in one parameter (ζ ∗ = max(ζB > ζA)). Thus, we
predict more support under optimal compensation than under heterogeneity in
one parameter.
Hypothesis 5 (compensated heterogeneity) The probability of providing social
support is larger under a heterogeneous distribution of two parameters, such
that the heterogeneity of one parameter optimally compensates for the hetero-
geneity of the other parameter, than under a heterogeneous distribution of one
parameter.
We want to stress that there exists an ‘optimal degree of compensation’.
Up to this level, the larger the compensation of the heterogeneity of the two
parameters, the more social support there is above this level of heterogeneity,
the compensation becomes less effective and consequently support starts to
decrease again.
Figure 1 combines hypotheses 4 and 5. The figure shows that the negative
effect of heterogeneity in one parameter can either be compensated by the
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Fig. 1 Heterogeneity in two dimensions (compounded vs. compensated heterogeneity)
negative effect of heterogeneity in another parameter or compounded by the
negative effect of heterogeneity in another parameter. In the first case, heter-
ogeneity in individual properties encourages mutual dependence relationships.
This happens, for instance, when the actor with the high costs of providing
support has a supportive relation with a less needy actor with low costs of
providing support. In the second case, heterogeneity in individual properties
hampers mutual dependence relationships. Now, the actor with the high costs
of providing support has a supportive relation with a needier actor with low
costs of providing support.
For a formal proof of the hypotheses seeVogt andWeesie (2004). In Sect. 3.2,
we derive testable implications of the hypotheses. We use the experimental
design (Sect. 3.1) to present these implications. The experimental conditions
reflect the hypotheses and the testable implications.
3 Experiment
To test our hypotheses, we use data from a laboratory experiment, in which
subjects played series of ISGs. We first introduce the experimental set-up in
more detail. Subsequently, we discuss the statistical model and the empirical
findings.
3.1 Design
General set-up of the experiment: A laboratory experiment with 148 subjects
was carried out at Utrecht University, the Netherlands, in May 2004. Subjects
played homogeneous and heterogeneous ISGs.2
Subjects: Subjects participated in reaction to an advertisement inviting
them to participate in a ‘decision-making experiment’. The advertisement
promised them between 9 and 18 euros for participation. The number of sub-
jects in one experimental session ranged from 14 up to 18 subjects. Sixty-eight
percent of the participants were female. Most of the participants were students,
coming from a variety of disciplines. Subjects were on average 22 years old
(std. 3.6).
2 Information about the full documentation of the experiment can be found at
http://www.fss.uu.nl/soc/iscore/.
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Procedure: Upon entering the laboratory, subjects received a random
number and were asked to take a seat behind the PC with the correspond-
ing number. The subjects were at all times able to see each other to some
extent. The experiment was to be partly completed by pen and paper, and
partly by computer. The instructions were given on paper. The interactive part
of the experiment and the questionnaires were done by computer. All subjects
were given the same instructions. As a first task the subjects were asked to read
the instructions. The experiment was conducted with the software program
z-Tree (Fischbacher 1999). The introduction to the instructions ended with
three questions intended for testing the subjects’ understanding. The instruc-
tions emphasized that the payment at the end of the experiment would be
in accordance with the number of decisions that subjects had made. For each
point the subjects earned, they would receive one eurocent. It was explicitly
mentioned that there were no ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ decisions. All references to
heterogeneity were avoided. Subjects were told that they could interrupt any
task at any time to ask the experimenter for assistance.
The subjects played series of ISGs with other subjects. In each ISG one sub-
ject was assigned the role of person A and the other subject obtained the role
of person B. Subjects could not identify who the other person was with whom
they were playing. Roles A and B can be homogeneous with respect to the
benefit–cost ratio and neediness, or they can be heterogeneous. We present the
experimental conditions in terms of the individual parameters of role A and
role B in the next section. Which subject got which role was determined at
random by the computer. For a period of 15 min, i.e., one part of the experi-
ment, subjects played ISGs under one specific set of values for costs, benefits,
and neediness (one experimental condition). Subjects were linked with a ran-
domly selected other at the beginning of each ISG. Subjects may by accident
have been assigned to the same role and partner in subsequent ISGs. However,
they could not recognize their partner. The parameters remained the same
within each separate part of the game, but they varied between the different
parts. One single session was comprised of three different parts. Each subject
participated in one session. The entire experiment contained nine sessions.
In each decision situation the subjects got certain amounts of points (endow-
ments). All subjects run the risk of loosing all points with a certain probability
(likelihood of needing support). Half of the subjects were actually confronted
with the possibility of losing all their endowments. The subjects not in such a
situation had to make the decision whether to let their partners fold or else bail
him out at some cost to themselves. The benefits from receiving support, bi,
were the same as the endowment, since the benefits have been defined as the
difference between the situation of receiving help (keeping all endowments),
and not receiving help (losing all endowments). An actor, who did not run the
risk of losing points had to decide whether to help, or not to help his or her
partner. Helping was operationalized as giving away some own costly endow-
ments. Subjects could not choose the number of points they gave up, neither the
costs nor the benefits or probabilities of being under risk to lose points. These
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parameters were fixed within one part of a session (see section ‘conditions’
below).
The computer determined the duration of an ISG, i.e., how long two subjects
were matched together. A number from one to five was chosen, each with equal
probability. If five turned up the ISG ended. During the entire experiment, the
same continuation probability of 45 was used in all ISGs. We wanted to use
the dyadic threshold as a ‘measure’ of how likely social support is given differ-
ent heterogeneous distributions of the individual parameters. Keeping w fixed
allows us to focus exclusively on the effects of increasing or decreasing hetero-
geneity (i.e., increasing or decreasing ζ ∗). Moreover, we feared that varying w
would make the experiment unnecessarily more complicated for the subjects.
Changing partners was a necessity, but changing roles was not. Since an ISG
only ended when a certain probability had been reached after each decision, no
part lasted exactly 15 min.
A session started with four practice decision situations (for a discussion on
the effects of experience with the decision situation, see e.g., Camerer and
Weigelt 1988). Subjects were informed during the practice rounds that they
were playing against the computer and that they could not earn money.3
Questionnaire: After playing the games, subjects filled in a questionnaire
on a number of basic demographics and they were asked to evaluate a number
of statements on trust, reciprocity, support, giving and receiving compliments,
empathy, giving and denying help, etc. In total the experiment took between 70
and 90 min.
Conditions: The experiment varied the costs of providing support (cA, cB)
and the probabilities of needing support (πA,πB) between two subjects playing
an ISG and between the conditions. The benefits did not vary between subjects
(bA = bB), but the benefits varied between conditions. This was done in order
to obtain appropriate numbers for the benefit–cost ratio. It suffices to test the
hypotheses by varying these two parameters between subjects. In each part of
the experiment, subjects played support games with the parameters as they are
used in one of the nine conditions displayed in the design table below (Table 1).
The rows specify the nine conditions of the experiment, the individual thresh-
olds ζi, and the equilibrium threshold ζ ∗ as derived from our game-theoretic
model (assuming ‘ownpointsmatch utility’). Consider, for instance,C9. Subjects
in role A need support with probability πA = 0.3. The costs for providing sup-
port in role A are cA = 8 points, and the benefits of role A are bA = 36 points.
Subjects in role B need support with probability πB = 0.7, thus much higher
than the probability of role A. The costs for providing support are cB = 24
points for role B. This is three times more than the costs for role A. The benefits
are the same for rolesA andB, namely bA = bB = 36 points. In accordancewith
the equilibrium condition (Sect. 2.2), these parameters lead to the individual
3 The practice rounds were designed in such a way that both the computer and the subjects run
the risk of losing all points twice. In the cases where the subjects run the risk to lose points, the
computer ‘provided support’ once, and did ‘not provide support’ once. The practice round was a
game under heterogeneity in probabilities and costs.
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Table 1 Experimental design
Parameters Thresholds
Condition description πA πB cA cB bA = bB ζA ζB ζ∗
Symmetry in all parameters
C1: πA = πB, cA = cB 0.5 0.5 8 8 24 0.50 0.50 0.50
Heterogeneity in one parameter
C2: πA = πB, cA < cB, 0.5 0.5 8 16 32 0.40 0.67 0.67
C3: πA = πB, cA << cB 0.5 0.5 8 24 36 0.36 0.80 0.80
C4: πA > πB, cA = cB 0.6 0.4 8 8 24 0.42 0.63 0.63
C5: πA >> πB, cA = cB 0.7 0.3 8 8 24 0.36 0.83 0.83
Heterogeneity in two parameters
Compounded heterogeneity
C6: πA > πB, cA < cB 0.6 0.4 8 16 32 0.33 0.83 0.83
C7: πA > πB, cA << cB 0.6 0.4 8 24 36 0.30 1 1.00
Compensated heterogeneity
C8: πA << πB, cA < cB 0.3 0.7 8 16 32 0.67 0.48 0.67
C9: πA << πB, cA << cB 0.3 0.7 8 24 36 0.61 0.57 0.61
thresholds ζA = 0.61 and ζB = 0.57, and to the dyadic threshold ζ ∗ = max(ζA,




= 6. One aim of the design was to obtain maximal variation in the
dyadic thresholds. However, we did not want to vary neediness too much, since
we wanted to avoid situations in which one actor almost permanently needs
support.
The nine experimental conditions can be grouped in the following way. The
first condition, C1, uses a homogeneous distribution of the costs and neediness.
The four conditions (C2, C3, C4, C5) specify ‘small’ and ‘large’ heterogeneity
in one parameter, i.e., either in the costs or in neediness. The last four con-
ditions specify heterogeneity in the costs and in neediness, first compounded
heterogeneity (C6, C7) and then compensated heterogeneity (C8, C9).
The experiment contained the following sessions: (1) C1 − C6 − C9, (2)
C7 −C5 −C2, and (3) C8 −C3 −C4. The design of the experiment was a within
and between subjects design. Due to computer network problems, and conse-
quently time problems, we could not complete the third part in two sessions,
which means we have less data on the conditions C9 and C2.
3.2 A comparison of the experimental conditions
We now consider the nine conditions in more detail, and discuss the implica-
tions of the hypotheses 2–5; we compare the percentages of support (P1 − P9)
under the experimental conditions (C1 − C9). The first condition C1 specifies
a fully homogeneous situation in c and π . A totally homogeneous distribution
of the individual parameters between actors leads to the smallest threshold
(hypothesis ‘homogeneity’). Based on hypothesis 3 we consequently predict
more support under C1 than under any other condition (C2 through C9):
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Comparison 1:P1 > P2, P3, P4, P5, P6, P7, P8, P9.
ConditionsC2−C5 involve heterogeneity in either the costs or neediness param-
eters and homogeneity in the other parameters. The two conditions C2 and C3
specify heterogeneity in the costs (c). The heterogeneity in the costs is larger
in C3 than in C2. Similarly, the conditions C4 and C5 specify heterogeneity in
neediness (π) with larger heterogeneity under C4 than under C5. We predict
that heterogeneity in either costs or neediness hampers social support and that
a larger heterogeneity hampers support even more (hypothesis ‘heterogeneity
in one parameter’):
Comparison 2:P2 > P3, P4 > P5.
In the remaining four conditions (C6−C9), we induce heterogeneity in both the
costs (c) and neediness (π). First, we induce heterogeneity in such away that the
heterogeneity in both parameters compounds. UnderC6 actor A needs support
more often than actor B (0.6 > 0.4), while actor B has the higher support costs
(16 > 8). Thus, A is in a great deal of trouble, and we expect a very low support
rate. The same holds forC7. In hypothesis 4 we predict that a situation with two
problems for one actor leads to less support than a situation with one problem
for one actor (‘compounded heterogeneity’). Comparing situations with heter-
ogeneity in one parameter with situations with compounded heterogeneity, we
predict more support in situations with heterogeneity in either costs or need-
iness (C2, C3, C4) than in situations with compounded heterogeneity in costs
and neediness (C7, C8):
Comparison 3:P2 > P6, P4 > P6, P3 > P7, P4 > P7.
Under C7 we have a higher degree of heterogeneity in the costs (24 > 8) than
under C6 (16 > 8), while the heterogeneity in neediness is the same, i.e., the
compounded heterogeneity in costs and neediness is larger in C7 than in C6.
Consequently, we predict more support under C6 than under C7:
Comparison 4:P6 > P7.
Under the last two conditions (C8 and C9) the heterogeneous distribution of
one parameter (c) is compensated by the heterogeneous distribution of another
parameter (π); role B has higher support costs than role A, but role A needs
support less often than role B. Now the two problems caused by heterogeneity
are divided between the two actors. Under condition C9 the heterogeneous
distribution of the costs is even more extreme than under condition C8. It is
interesting that larger heterogeneous costs compensate for the heterogeneity
in neediness even ‘better’ than smaller heterogeneity in the costs do. This is
reflected in the dyadic thresholds of the conditions C8 and C9 (0.67 > 0.61).
Based on the compensation hypothesis, we predict more support under the
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‘better’ problem division of C9 than under C8:
Comparison 5:P9 > P8.
The experimental designdoes not includeoptimal compensation.Consequently,
we cannot compare optimal compensation of heterogeneity in two parameters
with heterogeneity in one parameter. Compensation that is not optimal does
not necessarily lead to a smaller ζ ∗, and thus to a higher support rate than
heterogeneity in one dimension. As numerical example, compare C2 and C8; in
both conditions the dyadic threshold is ζ ∗ = 0.67.
3.3 Statistical model
The following section discusses statistical tests of our hypotheses and testable
implications. The data is analyzed from the perspective of the actor faced with
the choice of providing support to the other actor (we call this actor Ego), thus
the binary dependent variable is whether or not Ego provides support. The
theoretical analysis assumes complete information and is not appropriate for
deriving realistic hypotheses about behavioral dynamics. To exclude common
history effects we restrict our analysis to the first decision in the ISGs.
A subject’s decision to either provide or not to provide support is the outcome
of a discrete choice. To make an estimation of the first decisions in a single ISG,
one would normally use an ordinary logit or probit regression model. But this is
not appropriate, since the ISGs are repeated within subjects. Therefore, we use
an extension of the logistic regression model that incorporates random or fixed
subject effects, the Linear Logistic Test Model (LLTM, see Fischer 1997: 226–
227). The starting point in formulating the statistical model is the simple Rasch
model of item response theory. The Rasch model involves ‘difficulties’ of the
items (decision situations) and individual abilities. With the LLTM we model
the choices of subjects in a similar way. Subject i’s decision whether to provide
support (yi = 1) or not to provide support (yi = 0) is assumed to depend on the
difference between i’ s personal parameter θi, representing a person’s ‘general
willingness’ to provide support, and a parameter ϑr, representing the situation
in which the person made his or her decision:
πirh = Pr(yirh = 1| θi,ϑr) = e
θi−ϑr
1 + eθi−ϑr , (2)
where r indexes conditions and h indexes repetition, i.e., playing ISGs with
different partners, within each condition r. Our hypotheses are formulated as
assertions about differences in support behavior between certain homogeneous
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zkr are characteristics of experimental conditions and βk are the parameters to
be estimated. We use a random effects specification for the subject parameter,
and estimate the model with marginal maximum likelihood. We present two
models. The first model ‘explains’ differences in the support rates of conditions
C1 to C9 with the dyadic threshold ζ ∗ as hypothesized in hypotheses 1 and 2. In
the second model, we estimate the simple Rasch model in which each condition
is represented by a dummy. This specification allows us to test the ranking of
the nine conditions as hypothesized in sections 2.3 (hypotheses 3–5) and 3.2
without the strong assumption that the support rates are a smooth function
of ζ ∗.
4 Results
First we present a number of descriptive results of the experiment. Subjects
played on average 4.8 ISGs per part (std. 3.0). Per ISG 4.5 decisions were made
on average (std. 3.6). Table 2 displays the percentages of support provided in
the first round of each ISG. Our theoretic model does not predict a difference
in behavior between roles A and B, since the same ζ ∗ holds for both. We will
review this expectation at the end of this section. The percentages of support
provided under each condition are not in strict accordance with our hypothesis
that the support rate is higher, the smaller the threshold condition; the larg-
est percentage of support is not found under a homogeneous distribution of
all parameters as predicted by the threshold model. To give another example,
there is more support under C7 (ζ ∗=1.00) than under C9 (ζ ∗ = 0.61).
Table 2 Percentage of support in the first round of ISGs
Condition description A and B: N ζ∗ A: N ζA B: N ζB
support in support in support in
round 1 round 1 round 1
C1: Homogeneity 72 145 0.50
C2: Small heterogeneity
in costs
54 58 0.67 64 28 0.40 43 30 0.67
C3: Big heterogeneity
in costs
58 144 0.80 76 75 0.36 39 60 0.80
C4: Small heterogeneity
in neediness
79 121 0.63 79 43 0.42 78 78 0.63
C5: Big heterogeneity
in neediness
65 159 0.83 86 70 0.36 49 89 0.83
C6: Small compounded
heterogeneity
40 117 0.83 59 51 0.33 26 66 0.83
C7: Big compounded
heterogeneity
61 170 1.00 77 48 0.30 55 122 1.00
C8: Small compensated
heterogeneity
77 66 0.67 79 42 0.67 75 24 0.48
C9: Big compensated
heterogeneity
56 45 0.61 74 27 0.61 28 18 0.57
228 S. Vogt, J. Weesie
We now focus on hypothesis 1 based on the ISG (see Sect. 2.2). We hypothe-
size that supportive behavior decreasesmonotonicallywith the dyadic threshold
ζ ∗. We fitted a linear and a quadratic model in ζ ∗; the simpler linear model fits
equally well (LR χ2 = 1.48, p-two-sided= 0.2241). As predicted, the effect of
ζ ∗ on the probability of support is negative. In this sense, our hypothesis is not
rejected. To evaluate whether the threshold model really fits the data, we also
fitted amodel in which dummy variables represent the experimental conditions,
i.e., amodel saturatedwith respect to all experimental conditions.Wehadhoped
that the thresholdmodel fits as well as themodel which is saturated with respect
to conditions. This turns out not to be the case (LR χ2(7) = 21.35, p = 0.0033).
We conclude that we need to be cautious in our interpretation of the positive
support for the hypothesis that support decreases in the dyadic threshold. Note
that we do not control for experiences subjects have from previously played
ISGs.
Based on the hypotheses 2–5, we derived a series of testable implications
about the ranking of the support rates of the nine experimental conditions (see
Sects. 2.2 and 3.1; Table 3). Table 4 reports Wald tests of the predictions, based
on a simple random effects Rasch model.
The hypothesis ‘heterogeneity in one parameter’ states that support is less
likely under heterogeneity in one parameter than under full homogeneity.
Thus, in comparison 1 we compare the percentages of support under full
homogeneity (C1) with the percentages of support under conditions of het-
erogeneity either in the costs (C2 and C3) or in neediness (C4 and C5). We find
a significant difference in the predicted direction in behavior between homoge-
neity (C1) on the one hand, and heterogeneity in costs (C2, C3), as well as large
Table 3 Random effect logistic regression for first choices in ISGs
Threshold model Model including
all conditions
b SE b SE
ζ∗ −2.452 0.606
Constant 2.549 0.480
C1: Homogeneity 1.425 0.293
C2: Small heterogeneity in costs 0.066 0.372
C3: Big heterogeneity in costs 0.483 0.263
C4: Small heterogeneity in neediness 1.548 0.338
C5: Big heterogeneity in neediness 0.502 0.286
C6: Small compounded heterogeneity 1.018 0.276
C7: Big compounded heterogeneity −0.450 0.301
C8: Small compensated heterogeneity 1.302 0.401
C9: Big compensated heterogeneity 0.349 0.435
Standard deviation of random effect 1.350 1.351






Number of choices 1,025 1,025
Number of subjects 148 148
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heterogeneity in neediness (C5) on the other hand. We do not find a significant
difference between the percentages of support under homogeneity (C1) and
small heterogeneity in neediness (C4).
In comparison 2, we predict that the more heterogeneous the distribution
of costs or neediness, the less likely is social support. Thus, we compare small
heterogeneity in neediness with large heterogeneity in neediness, and small
heterogeneity in the costs with large heterogeneity in the costs. As expected,
a small heterogeneity in neediness (C4) leads to a higher support rate than a
large heterogeneity (C5). For costs, the difference between small heterogeneity
(C2) and large heterogeneity (C3) are not found.
The hypothesis ‘compounded heterogeneity’ states that heterogeneity in two
parameters leads to less support if the heterogeneity compounds. In comparison
3 we compare the percentages of support under heterogeneity in one parameter
(C2, C3, C4) with the percentages of support under compounded heterogeneity
in two parameters (C6, C7). The implications are partly supported. We find sig-
nificant differences in supportive behavior in three cases. First, people become
less supportive if they differ largely in the costs (C3) and a small difference in
neediness (C7) is added. Second, the percentage of support is significantly less
if, in addition to a small heterogeneity in neediness (C4), a large heterogeneity
in the costs (C7) is added, such that the less needy person has higher support
costs. We do not find a significant effect on supportive behavior if a small heter-
ogeneity in the costs (C6) compounds with a small heterogeneity in neediness
(C4). We predict less support if a small heterogeneity in neediness (C6) com-
pounds with a small heterogeneity in the costs (C2). This prediction is rejected
by the data. Additionally, we predicted that support is less likely the larger the
compounded heterogeneity in the costs and neediness (comparison 4). We find
that people tend to provide less support if they already differ with regard to
costs and neediness (C6) and the heterogeneity in the costs increases (C7).
Based on the hypothesis ‘compensated heterogeneity’, we expect more sup-
port the ‘better’ the problems are divided between the actors, i.e., the better
the heterogeneity is compensated. Since the heterogeneity is ‘better’ compen-
sated under C9 than under C8, we expect P9 > P8. This is rejected by the data
(comparison 5). Our experimental design does not allow for a comparison of
compensation with heterogeneity in one dimension. Therefore, we cannot test
the entire hypothesis.
According to the hypothesis on ‘homogeneity’, social support is most likely
if all parameters are homogeneous (comparison 1). This is largely supported,
though in some cases the difference in supportive behavior is not significant.
The latter case consists of the situations with small heterogeneous distributions
such as small heterogeneity in neediness (P4), small compound of heterogeneity
in neediness and the costs (P6), and small compensation of heterogeneity in the
costs and neediness (P8)—except for small heterogeneity in the costs (P2).
Generally speaking, behavior does not seem to be influenced if a small prob-
lem is added to an actor already facing a small problem, or to an actor who does
not have a problem. However, if a large problem is added, there is a signifi-
cant difference in the behavior of the subjects in the expected direction. This
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suggests that the ‘small effects’ are not found to bemostly due to a lack of power.
Unfortunately, our design does not allow to compare the situations where two
individual parameters are distributed heterogeneous in such a way that sup-
port is either facilitated (i.e., heterogeneity in one parameter ‘compounds’ the
negative effect of heterogeneity in another parameter) or hampered (i.e., het-
erogeneity in one parameter ‘compensates’ the negative effect of heterogeneity
in another parameter), see Fig. 1.
Before we conclude, we would like to address one more issue. According to
the dyadic threshold model we did not expect a difference in the behavior of
role A and role B. Based on the logic of trigger strategies in ISGs, we argue that
both players provide support if and only if it is mutually rational to do so (based
on the dyadic threshold condition ζ ∗). If it is not in B’s interest to offer support,
A will recognize this and will offer no support either. Consequently, both actors
either provide support or do not provide support. However, under certain con-
ditions one partner faces problems such as high support costs, whereas the other
person faces no problems at all, or ‘small’ problems only. Intuitively, one might
expect different behavior from these two persons, namely that the person with
the higher support costs provides support less often than the person with the
lower support costs. That is, individual behaviormaywell depend on the individ-
ual threshold directly. This can be related to bargaining solutions and to other
equilibria in the theory of repeated games. Based on Table 2 we expect that the
behavior of subjects in roles A and B indeed differ, namely such that the lower
the individual threshold, the more an actor provides support. To test this, we
Table 4 Test of qualitative predictions on supportive behavior per condition
Wald z One sided p value
Hypothesis ‘heterogeneity in one parameter’
Homogeneity versus heterogeneity in one parameter
P1 > P2 2.87 0.002 *
P1 > P3 2.55 0.011 *
P1 > P4 −0.28 0.612 NC
P1 > P5 2.26 0.024 *
Small versus large heterogeneity in one parameter
P2 > P3 −0.91 0.820 NC
P4 > P5 2.37 0.009 *
Heterogeneity in one versus heterogeneity in two
parameters (‘compounded heterogeneity’)
P3 > P7 2.33 0.010 *
P4 > P7 4.41 0.000 *
P4 > P6 1.26 0.105 NC
P2 > P6 −2.05 0.980 **
Hypothesis ‘compounded heterogeneity’
P6 > P7 3.59 0.000 *
Hypothesis ‘compensated heterogeneity’
P9 > P8 −1.62 0.948 **
* confirmed, ** rejected,
NC not confirmed
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fitted an additional model which is saturated with respect to conditions and to
role.4 A test against model 2 of Table 2 demonstrates that behavior does indeed
vary with role (LR χ2(8) = 96.91, P < 0.000). This implies that our theoretical
model could be improved by relaxing certain assumptions, such that a common
threshold for both actors does not follow. This is elaborated in the discussion.
5 Conclusion
We conjectured that supportive behavior depends monotonically on the dyadic
threshold ζ ∗. Tests have shown that the model which is saturated with respect
to conditions fitted the data considerably better than the linear model of ζ ∗.
We are, therefore, reluctant in concluding that social support is more likely
the smaller the dyadic threshold. The tests on the qualitative predictions are
more satisfactory. We found that small heterogeneity does not seem to matter;
only large heterogeneity leads to different behavioral consequences. Support-
ive behavior in homogeneous situations differs significantly from supportive
behavior in situations with large heterogeneity in one parameter. In line with
this, we also found that if heterogeneity increases, social support is less likely.
The only two exceptions are the comparison of small heterogeneity in the costs
with small compounded heterogeneity, as well as large and small compensation,
which turned out to be non-significant.
Finally, we wish to discuss one additional point with respect to the ISG. Our
analysis has shown that the assumption that both actors provide support only
if it is individually rational for both of them (the dyadic threshold condition) is
not appropriate; subjects in role A behave different from actors in role B. This
allows us to study heterogeneity in terms of roles. Intuitively, one could expect
an actor facing one or two ‘problems’ to behave differently from an actor who
is not facing any ‘problems’. The data indicate that subjects in the advantageous
role generally provide support more often than subjects in the disadvantageous
role. One explanation might be that subjects follow certain fairness principles;
the advantageous actors may be willing to provide support more often so that
both actors receive the same outcome. If fairness matters, actors compare their
own outcome and the outcome of their partner with a ‘fair share’. Incorporat-
ing fairness would allow for an analysis of the full history of ISGs under the
assumption that actors ‘maximize fairness’. Fairness principles can be derived,
for instance, from equity or bargaining theory.
In a future experiment, it would be interesting to run additional conditions
where we keep ζ ∗ fixed and vary the continuation probability. For the pre-
dictions it is only relevant whether w is larger or smaller than ζ ∗. Varying
the continuation probability instead of the dyadic threshold should not have
different effects on actors’ behavior. Furthermore, it would be interesting to
induce heterogeneity in the benefit-cost ratio via the benefits rather than the
costs. Intuitively, we expected heterogeneity in the costs to be more salient than
4 Obviously, under homogeneous roles, A and B do not differ. Therefore, the test has 8 df.
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in the benefits. However, theoretically there is no difference between inducing
heterogeneity via costs or benefits.
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